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LIST OF PARTIES 
In the original action, civil number 5719, the following 
plaintiffs sought recovery for the death of Wallace Muir: 
Evelyn Muir 
Linda Muir 
Deanna Pfeiffer 
Sandra Jenkins 
Mark Muir 
In that action the following plaintiffs alleged personal 
injury: 
Mario Jenkins 
Douglas Bailey 
The action was filed on behalf of all plaintiffs by: 
Ross C. Anderson 
William P. Schwartz 
Hanson and Anderson 
50 West Broadway, 6th floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 532-7520 
The plaintiffs were later represented by: 
Robert H. Copier 
243 East 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 531-0099 
The only defendants served in civil number 5719 or any 
subsequent actions were: 
Apache Nitrogen Products, fka Apache Powder Company, 
represented by: 
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H. James Clegg 
Shawn E. Draney 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145; and 
W. H. Burt Explosives, Inc., represented by: 
Roger P. Christensen 
Karra J. Porter 
Christensen, Jensen & Powell, P.C. 
510 Clark Learning Building 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 355-3431 
Before civil number 5719 was dismissed, plaintiffs filed a 
new action, civil number 5873. In that new action Virginia Lowe 
was added for the first time as a plaintiff. Mr. Copier appeared 
as counsel for all plaintiffs in that action. 
The first action, civil number 5719, was dismissed without 
prejudice on February 5. 1990. The only plaintiff that appealed 
that order of dismissal was Evelyn Muir. The defendants cross 
appealed contending the case should have been dismissed with 
prejudice against all plaintiffs, but that cross appeal has been 
dropped. 
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
EVELYN MUIR, 
Plaintiff, Appellant, 
and Cross-Appellee, 
vs. 
W. H. BURT EXPLOSIVES, INC., a Case No. 900100 
New Mexico corporation and 
APACHE POWDER COMPANY, a New 
Jersey corporation, 
Defendants, Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE APACHE NITROGEN PRODUCTS 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court does not have jurisdiction. Evelyn Muir appeals 
from orders which dismiss only some plaintiffs. The claims of 
plaintiff Douglas Bailey are currently pending. The orders 
appealed from are not "final" under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
54(b) and Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 3. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. The plaintiff appeals from two orders. The first is an 
order which dismissed the first action, civil number 5719, with-
out prejudice. The second is an order which dismissed the claims 
of some plaintiffs in the second action, civil number 5873, with 
prejudice and the claims of some plaintiffs without prejudice. 
At least some of the claims dismissed without prejudice are still 
pending in the trial court. Neither of the orders were certified 
as final pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). The 
plaintiff did not seek leave to file an interlocutory appeal. 
Has plaintiff appealed from a final, appealable order? 
Whether there is a final, appealable order appears to be an 
issue of this court's jurisdiction. As such, this court must 
independently assess whether it has jurisdiction. See, E.o., 
Allen Steel Co. v, Crossroads Plaza Assocs., 119 Utah Adv. Rep. 
6, 9 (Utah 1989); Olson v. Salt Lake City School Dist., 724 P.2d 
960, 964 (Utah 1986). 
2. After the Complaint was filed in civil number 5719 
copies of the Summons and Complaint were given to a court runner 
employed the law firm representing plaintiffs. In order for a 
Summons to be "issued" it must be given to a qualified person for 
purposes of service. Under former Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
4(d) a party is not qualified. Is the attorney for a party or 
the employee of that attorney qualified? 
This is an issue of law. The trial court's conclusions of 
law are reviewed for correctness. E.Q., City of West Jordan v. 
Utah State Retirement Bd., 767 P.2d 530, 532 (Utah 1988). 
3. The court runner was instructed to "hold off" on 
service. Consistent with those instructions, no effort was made 
to serve either defendant for more than ten months following the 
filing of the Complaint. Then, counsel for plaintiffs asked the 
runner to forward the Summons and Complaint to process servers in 
New Jersey and New Mexico. Did the trial court error in finding 
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the Summons had not been placed in the hands of a qualified 
person for purpose of service within three months as required by 
former Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b)? 
Apache's motion to dismiss was brought in part pursuant to 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). This court has held that 
findings of fact which support a Rule 41(b) order of dismissal 
are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. E.g.. Lemon v. 
Coates. 735 P.2d 58, 60 (Utah 1987); Wessel v. Erickson 
Landscaping Co.. 711 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah 1985). 
4. The second action, civil number 5873, was filed after 
the two year statute of limitations for wrongful death expired. 
The trial court ruled that when the plaintiff failed to issue the 
Summons within three months, the action was not "commenced within 
due time" within the meaning of the savings statute, Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-40. The trial court, therefore, dismissed the 
wrongful death claims with prejudice. Did the court err? 
This issue involves the interpretation of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure and the savings statute, which are questions of 
law. 
STATUTES AND RULES 
(a) Issuance of summons. The summons may be 
signed and issued by the plaintiff or his attorney. A 
summons shall be deemed to have issued when placed in 
the hands of a qualified person for the purpose of 
service. Separate summonses may be issued and served. 
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(b) Time of issuance and pervlce. If an action 
is commenced by the filing of a complaint, summons must 
issue thereon within three months from the date of such 
filing* The summons must be served within one year 
after the filing of the complaint or the action will be 
deemed dismissed, provided that in any action brought 
against two or more defendants in which personal 
service has been obtained upon one of them within the 
year, the other or others may be served or appear at 
any time before trial. 
Former U.R.Civ.P. 4. 
If any action is commenced within due time and a 
judgment thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or if 
the plaintiff fails in such action or upon a cause of 
action otherwise than upon the merits, and the time 
limited either by law or contract for commencing the 
same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies 
and the cause of action survives, his representatives, 
may commence a new action within one year after the 
reversal or failure. 
Utah Code Ann- § 78-12-40 (1953). 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or Involving 
multiple parties. When more than one claim for relief 
is presented in an action/ whether as a claim# counter-
claim, cross-claim/ or third-party claim/ and/or when 
multiple parties are involved/ the court may direct the 
entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer 
than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
determination by the court that there is no just reason 
for delay and upon an express direction for the entry 
of judgment. In the absence of such determination and 
direction, any order or other form of decision/ however 
designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims 
or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the 
parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the 
claims or parties/ and the order or other form of deci-
sion is subject to revision at any time before the 
entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the 
rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
U.R. Civ. P. 54(b). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 5, 1986# Wallace Muir and Douglas Bailey were 
searching for a fabled Spanish gold mine in the mountains of 
Duchesne County. They were blasting a tunnel with dynamite, 
ammonium nitrate (an explosive) and fuse. Bailey was lighting 
between 25 and 30 separate fuses by hand. Each of the fuses was 
attached to a stick of dynamite that was at the back of a four 
foot deep hole in the face of the rock. Each hole was filled 
with ammonium nitrate. Muir was standing nearby. After all but 
the last charge had been lit, an explosion occurred. Bailey 
received blast injuries to his back. Wallace Muir died of 
suffocation. 
The plaintiffs allege the blast occurred prematurely because 
the fuse manufactured by Apache and sold by Burt burned too fast. 
The defendants deny there was anything wrong with the fuse. They 
claim the accident occurred because Bailey and Muir lit too many 
individual short fuses by hand and otherwise used outdated and 
unsafe methods of blasting. 
The original Complaint, civil number 5719, was filed by the 
law firm of Hanson and Anderson on September 1, 1988, four days 
before the two year wrongful death statute of limitations, Utah 
Code Ann. S 78-12-28(2) (1953), expired. (Rl.l) (to avoid 
confusion, the record in civil number 5719 will be designated Rl. 
The record in civil number 5873 will be designated R2.). 
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On July 6, 1989 Burt was served in Moab, Utah by the Grand 
County Sheriffs office. (R1.16). The Summons and Complaint had 
been received by the Grand County Sheriff on July 5, 1989. 
(R1.16). 
On July 12, 1989 Apache was served in Hunterdon County, New 
Jersey by the Hunterdon County Sheriff. (R1.33). The Summons 
was stamped indicating it had been received by the Hunterdon 
sheriff on July 10, 1989. (R1.34). 
The defendants each filed motions to dismiss because the 
summons had not been issued within three months after the filing 
of the Complaint as required by Rules 4(a) and (b). (R1.22, 44). 
Even before the defendants filed their motions plaintiffs 
filed the affidavit of Steven F. Jackson. The affidavit stated 
that the summons had been delivered to Mr. Jackson "for purpose 
of service." (Rl. 20). Because the affidavit was conclusory in 
nature, the Summons had not been served in more than ten months, 
and the Summons was not served by Mr. Jackson, the defendants 
each moved to extend the time for their reply in order to depose 
Mr. Jackson. (R1.57, 76). 
Despite plaintiffs' opposition, the court granted the 
extension of time to allow the deposition of Jackson to be taken. 
(R1.74, 94). 
Mr. Jackson testified in deposition that he was employed by 
the law firm of Hanson and Anderson. (Jackson depo., p. 7) (The 
deposition of Steven Jackson was published, R1.203, and is part 
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of the record, but was not paginated.)• Jackson was handed the 
Summons and Complaint by Mr. Schwartz# plaintiff's former counsel 
and an attorney with Hanson and Anderson, and instructed to "hold 
off" on serving them. (Jackson depo.,pp. 42-43, 50-51). 
Mr. Jackson understood he was to do nothing about serving the 
Summons and Complaint until he received further Instructions. 
(Jackson depo., p. 60-63). He never received further instruc-
tions until he was contacted by Mr. Copier in July, 1989. 
(Jackson depo., p. 51). When Copier contacted Jackson in July, 
1989, Copier asked Mr. Jackson what the charge would be if 
Jackson served the Summons and Complaint on Burt in Moab. The 
charge was too high. Instead, copies of the summons and com-
plaint were sent to the Hunterdon County sheriff and the Grand 
County sheriff for service. The cover letters that accompanied 
the copies of the Summons and Complaint are signed by Mr. Copier. 
(Jackson depo., pp. 51-54). 
After the deposition of Jackson was taken, and reply memo-
randa were filed by the defendants, plaintiff filed the affidavit 
of Mr. Schwartz. Paragraph 6 of that affidavit confirms Schwartz 
Masked him [Jackson] to hold off on service. . . ••• (R1.159, 
f 6). 
On November 27, 1989, more than a month before the trial 
court ruled on the motions to dismiss, plaintiffs filed civil 
number 5873. (R2.1). 
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On January, 5# 1990, the trial court issued a written 
ruling, finding that the summons had not been issued within three 
months as required by Rule 4. The court indicated it would enter 
an order dismissing the first Complaint, civil number 5719. 
(Rl.203-205). 
On January 25, 1990, Apache was served with the second 
Complaint, civil number 5873. (R2.62). On February 5, 1990, 
Apache filed a motion to dismiss the second Complaint, civil 
number 5873. (R2.35). Defendant Burt filed a similar motion. 
(R2.98). On February 22, the plaintiff served Apache with an 
Amended Complaint in civil number 5873 without first obtaining 
leave to do so. (R2.111). The Complaint in civil number 5873 is 
identical to the Amended Complaint, except that the Amended 
Complaint in civil number 5873 starts with a recitation that the 
case is filed under the savings statute, Utah Code Ann. 
S 78-12-40. Apache moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint as 
well. (R2.77). 
The order dismissing the first Complaint, civil number 5719, 
without prejudice was signed on February 5, 1990. (R1.258). 
Plaintiff Evelyn Muir appealed that order. (R1.260). 
On March 16, 1990, the trial court ruled on Apache's motion 
to dismiss in civil number 5873. The court found that the second 
action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The 
court ruled that the savings statute, Utah Code Ann. 5 78-12-40 
did not apply. Because the plaintiffs had not followed through 
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to see that the Summons and Complaint were timely issued, the 
first action had not be "commenced timely" within the meaning of 
the savings statute, (R2.132-134). On April 2, 1990 the order 
dismissing the wrongful death claims against Apache with preju-
dice and the personal Injury claims without prejudice was signed. 
(R2.166-67). Plaintiff has appealed that order. (R2.191). 
On June 15, 1990, Douglas Bailey filed a Complaint in the 
Third Judicial District Court, civil number 900903526PI. (Appen. 
A). The venue in that case was then transferred to Grand County 
and assigned the civil number 90-5997. (Appen. B). That case is 
still pending and the parties have agreed that any discovery 
taken in that case can be used in civil number 5873 or civil 
number 5719 in the event of reversal. (Appen. C). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. The plaintiff has not appealed a final order. 
The dismissal of some, but not all claims, or some, but not 
all parties, is not a final order unless the trial court makes an 
express determination that there is no just reason for delay and 
an express direction for the entry of judgment. U.R.Civ.P. 
54(b). The claims of Douglas Bailey are still pending before the 
district court. The plaintiff never sought or received the 
express direction and determination required by Rule 54(b). 
The purpose of Rule 54(b) is to prevent piecemeal and multi-
ple appeals in the same matter. Multiple appeals consume addi-
tional resources and time of the court and the parties. There is 
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little point in deciding issues on appeal that may become moot 
later as the result of decisions made in the trial court. That 
is exactly the situation with this case. 
II. Apache did not waive its right to Insist on compliance 
with Rules 4(a) and 4(b). 
Plaintiff claims that when jurisdictional defenses are 
raised with nonjurisdictional defenses, a general appearance has 
been made, and jurisdictional defenses are waived. This is 
patently inconsistent with Rule 12(b), which states that "[n]o 
defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more 
other defenses or objections.,f 
III. The Summons was not issued in three months. 
A. Plaintiff's claim that the summons was given to 
Steven Jackson for purpose of service is 
frivolous. 
Prior to April 1, 1990, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 4(a) 
stated: nA summons shall be deemed to have issued when placed in 
the hands of a qualified person for the purpose of service." 
Assuming that Mr. Jackson was qualified, he certainly was 
not given the summons for the purpose of service. There is no 
dispute. Jackson was told to "hold off on service." Rule 4 is 
not satisfied when the summons and complaint are given to another 
for storage! Rule 4 is not satisfied by some secret, subjective 
intent of counsel that someday, perhaps, the process server 
should take steps to perfect service. Nor is it satisfied by the 
attorney's subjective hope to comply with Rule 4. 
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The Rule should be given a reasonable interpretation, 
consistent with ordinary, common understanding of the terms used 
and the purposes of Rules 4(a) and 4(b). 
B. Mr. Jackson was not "Qualified" within the meaning 
of Rule 4, 
As of April 1, 1990, it is clear that an attorney of a party 
is not qualified to serve process. If an attorney cannot serve 
process, neither can the attorney's employees. 
Prior to April 1, 1990, Rule 4(d) defined those qualified to 
serve proces as including persons "over the age of 21 years, and 
not a party to the action. . . . " 
Throughout the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the term 
"party" is often used to mean both the party and the attorney 
representing that party. For example, Rule 5 requires that 
copies of all documents filed with the court be served upon "each 
of the parties." It has always been the practice to serve only 
attorneys. Service upon the attorney is service upon the party. 
Similarly, service by the attorney is service by the party. 
A prohibition against attorneys or their employees serving 
process is the interpretation most consistent with the purposes 
for having disinterested persons serve process, as this case 
graphically illustrates. The potential for gutter service and 
other abuses is simply too great under any other rule. 
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IV. The trial court was correct in ruling that the savings 
statute did not apply. 
The savings statute, Utah Code Ann, S 78-12-40 by its term 
applies only when the "action is commenced within due time." 
The trial court correctly ruled that when the plaintiff files a 
complaint days before the statute runs, the action is "commenced 
within due time" within the meaning of the statute only if the 
plaintiff also follows up to see that issuance of the summons and 
service are performed on time as required by Rules 4(a) and 4(b). 
Filing the complaint tolls the statute of limitations only 
conditionally. 
A. Plaintiff's interpretation of the savings statute 
is inconsistent with the background and history of 
Rules 3 and Rule 4. 
Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is modeled 
after, and similar to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3. The 
drafters of the federal rule expressly recognized there was an 
unanswered question whether the mere filing of a complaint tolls 
a statute of limitation, or whether any further step is required, 
such as delivery of the summons and complaint for service, or 
service of the summons and complaint. 
The differences between federal rules 3 and 4, and Utah 
Rules 3 and 4 appear to be an attempt by the Utah Supreme Court 
to answer the question left unanswered by the United States 
Supreme Court. Utah Rule 3 requires that if an action is com-
menced by service, a copy must be filed within 10 days or "the 
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action thus commenced shall be deemed dismissed." The use of the 
terms "deemed dismissed" suggest the action is dismissed, fib 
initio and was never properly commenced. Rule 4 uses this same 
language. 
B. Plaintiffs interpretation of the savings statute 
is inconsistent with the purposes of the statute 
of limitations and the savings statute, and also 
fundamental rules of statutory construction. 
This court has repeatedly recognized and relied upon the 
following rules of statutory construction: 
1. Statutes must be interpreted in light of their purpose; 
and 
2. Statutes pari materia should be construed in harmony 
with each other. 
The fundamental purpose of a statute of limitations is to 
insure timely notice to defendants so they can assemble a defense 
while the facts are still fresh. A statute of limitations pre-
vents stale claims. 
The savings statute was intended to compliment the statutes 
of limitations. If and when the purpose of the statue of limi-
tation has been met, i.e., the defendant has received timely 
notice, then the plaintiff should get an additional period of 
time to refile if the action is dismissed other than on the 
merits. 
Instead of complimenting the statute of limitations, the 
plaintiffs' interpretation of the savings statute completely 
defeats the statute of limitations. 
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C Plaintiff's Interpretation of the savings statute 
is inconsistent with the purpose for Rules 4(al 
and 4 lb) and renders these rules meaningless. 
Rules 4(a) and 4(b) were Intended to assure the case, once 
filed, proceeds at some minimum pace. Under the interpretation 
proposed by plaintiff, these rules, in conjunction with the 
savings statute greatly enhance delay. 
D. Plaintiff's interpretation of the savings statute 
is inconsistent with the legislative history of 
the statute and puts the statute in conflict with 
Rules 3 and 4, 
Clearly, the savings statute and the rules of civil proce-
dure must be interpreted in harmony with one another. The 
legislature did not intend to interfere with the operation of the 
rules of civil procedure, nor did it have the power to do so. 
Similarly, this court did not intend for any conflict between the 
Rule and statutes. Under plaintiff's interpretation, Rules 3 and 
4 render the statutes of limitation meaningless and the savings 
statute renders Rule 4 meaningless. Such conflict must be 
avoided by reasonable interpretation. 
E. Plaintiff's interpretation of the savings statute 
is inconsistent with cases from other courts which 
interpret similar rules. 
A number of courts have rules like Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 3 which state that an action is commenced by the filing 
of the complaint. These courts have ruled the filing of the 
complaint tolls the statute of limitations only conditionally. 
If the plaintiff does not follow up with prompt issuance of the 
summons and service, the statute is not tolled by the filing of 
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the complaint, despite the language that the case is commenced by 
filing the complaint. 
F- The Plaintiffs interpretation of the rules and 
the savings statute is inconsistent with Ideals of 
eoual protection and evenhanded justice. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure were intended to provide a 
just speedy and inexpensive determination of actions. ffJustice" 
implies equal application of the law and evenhandedness. 
A defendant is subject to default judgment for the full 
amount of the prayer if an answer or motion to dismiss is not 
filed in 20 days. This is not harsh or unjust. The court must 
have rules and must insist upon the parties moving the case along 
to completion. The plaintiff is also required to move the case 
along. She had three months to simply get the summons to a 
process server and give instructions to serve it. She had an 
additional nine months to see that it was actually served. If 
the plaintiff is not only excused from this requirement, but 
given additional time under the statute of limitations for her 
failure to follow the rules, the goal of a just and speedy 
conclusion will not be realized. 
V. Plaintiff waived claims that the trial court should 
have held a hearing and claims that the savings statute 
is unconstitutional. 
Local rules required plaintiff to request a hearing if she 
wanted one, otherwise hearing was waived. Plaintiff not only 
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failed to request a hearing she affirmatively asked the court to 
decide the matters without hear. 
Plaintiff now raises an oblique reference to the savings 
statute being unconstitutional. That issue was not sufficiently 
raised in the trial court to preserve it for appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF HAS NOT APPEALED A FINAL ORDER. 
THIS COURT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION. 
Under Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
appeals of right can only be taken from "final orders and 
judgments." This rule replaced Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 72 
in 1985. The purpose and policy of Rule 3 is the same as the 
previous Rule 72, which this court described as follows: 
Article VIII, S 9 of the Utah Constitution and Rule 
72(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provide for 
appeals to this Court from all final orders and judg-
ments from district court. The policy underlying these 
provisions is sound. In the first place, it promotes 
judicial economy by preventing piecemeal appeals in the 
same litigation to this Court. At least some appeals 
would ultimately never be taken, since the party 
aggrieved by an interlocutory order may, in the end, 
prevail. Also, expense to litigants and the judiciary 
is reduced by the general requirement that all issues 
be appealed in one procedure. Further, the final 
judgment rule prevents this Court from intermeddling in 
the business of the trial courts before they have had 
opportunity to rectify some of their own possible 
misjudgments and before they have completed the trial. 
Finally, the final judgment rule prevents the inter-
minable protraction of lawsuits. In a day when the 
case load of this Court has risen astronomically and 
seriously strains our resources, there is even addi-
tional reason for applying the final judgment rule. 
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Kennedy v. New Era Indust., Inc.. 600 P*2d 534, 535 (Utah 1979). 
This court continues to refer to Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(b) for the definition of what is a final order; 
Rule 54(b) authorizes a trial court In cases involving 
multiple claims or multiple parties to direct the entry 
of a final judgment, before all issues have been set-
tled, as to some of the claims or some of the parties 
upon a finding that "there is no just reason for delay 
and upon an express direction for the entry of judg-
ment." A strong reason supporting this rule is that 
the trial court, having an overview of the total 
litigation, is in a position to determine whether such 
an order would promote efficiency, serve the ends of 
justice, and save this Court from having to deal with 
the same or similar issues in a piecemeal fashion. 
Id., at 536. 
This case is controlled by Steck v. Aaaaire, 789 P.2d 708 
(Utah 1990). In Steck, three wrongful death cases arising out of 
the same helicopter crash were consolidated. The trial court 
granted one defendant summary judgment as to the claims of the 
heirs of two victims. This court said: 
Because the judgment appealed does not dispose of 
all claims of all parties in the consolidated case, it 
does not constitute a final judgment, and this court 
has no jurisdiction to review it. 
Id., at 709. 
In the case at bar, the claims of Douglas Bailey arising 
from the same accident are being actively pursued against both 
defendants in the trial court. A judgement on the merits against 
Bailey that the fuse in question was not defective and/or did not 
proximately cause the explosion would moot the claims of Muir. A 
final judgment is binding upon parties and those in privity with 
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them. E.g., Det>t. of Social Services v. Ruscetta* 742 P.2d 114, 
116 (Utah App. 1987). This "foster[s] judicial economy by 
preventing redundant litigation." I£. "In the context of res 
judicata, a person "in privity" is one so identified in interest 
with another that the same legal rights are represented." Id., 
at 117. Clearly, plaintiff Muir is a party and in privity. She 
brought her claim at the same time, in the same actions. She 
relies upon the same witnesses and theories. She hired the same 
counsel. There is simply little point in subjecting the parties 
to the expense of an appeal which may not be necessary. 
POINT II 
APACHE DID NOT WAIVE ITS RIGHT TO INSIST ON 
COMPLIANCE WITH RULES 4(a) and 4(b). 
Apache filed its motion to dismiss, and supporting memo-
randum and affidavit, in civil number 5719 on August 14, 1989. 
(R1.44). On month later Apache served a subpoena duces tecum and 
noticed up a records deposition for the state medical examiner. 
(R1.91). The notice made it clear that if the records were pro-
duced prior to the deposition, the witness would not be required 
to attend. (R1.92). Apache did this to confirm the alleged date 
of Kr. Muir's death for purposes of calculating exactly when the 
statute of limitations had run. 
Citing only the rules of baseball in support of her posi-
tion, plaintiff claims this limited discovery, the defendants' 
request for dismissal on the merits and the filing of a cross 
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appeal by the defendants was a general appearance and consent to 
the court's jurisdiction! and a waiver of any right to insist 
upon compliance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. As the 
plaintiff puts it, the defendants can take a walk, i.e., they can 
raise jurisdictional defenses (enter a special appearance), or 
they can swing, i.e., raise nonjurisdictional defenses (enter a 
general appearance). They can not do both. 
The appellate courts of this state have repeatedly held that 
the language of Rule 12(b) was specifically intended to allow the 
joinder of jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional defenses and 
abolish the distinctions between special and general appearances: 
The doctrines of "general" and "special" appearance, 
relied on by the court, are associated with personal 
jurisdiction only. Prior to the adoption of Rule 12(b) 
of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party was required 
to allege lack of personal jurisdiction and other 
jurisdictional defects separately from other nonjuris-
dictional defenses. f,[I]f a challenge of this type was 
joined with any nonjurisdictional defenses, the appear-
ance became 'general1 and the party's right to object 
to jurisdiction was waived." 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure S 1362 (1969). Today 
the distinction between general and special appearances 
has been effectively abolished by Rule 12(b), which 
permits jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional defenses 
to be joined. 
Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 717, 725-26 n. 17 (Utah App. 1990). 
The distinction between general and special appearances 
has been abolished by Rule 12(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Brown & Associates/Inc. v. Carnes Corp.. 
Utah, 547 P.2d 206 (1976). A party need no longer 
appear "specially" to attack the court's jurisdiction, 
and, conversely, a general appearance does not waive 
the objection of lack of jurisdiction over the person. 
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A person may challenge jurisdiction over his 
person in his answer and also assert defenses going to 
the merits without losing the jurisdictional claim. 
Alternatively, a defendant may raise his defenses in a 
motion prior to his answer. 
Clarkson v. Western Heritage, Inc.. 627 P.2d 72, 74 (Utah 1981) 
(Justice Stewart concurring)(citations omitted). 
While plaintiffs position may be supported by rules of 
baseball, it is patently inconsistent with the Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Rule 12(b) states: 
No defense or objection is waived by being joined with 
one or more other defenses or objections in a respon-
sive pleading or motion or by further pleading after 
the denial of such motion or objection. 
A party may raise an objection to service in an answer or 
motion, along with any other defenses. When a party raises a 
defense by motion, that party is by definition asking the court 
to dismiss at least a portion of the claims, either with or 
without prejudice. An answer, by definition means the defendant 
denies either responsibility and/or the damages alleged, usually 
both. By definition, an answer demands that at least a portion 
of the claims be dismissed with prejudice. Having preserved the 
defense, by either motion or answer, the defendant may proceed to 
defend the claims on the merits! 
Litigation is not baseball. The rules of baseball were 
designed to test the athletic prowess and strategy skills of 
contestants for purposes of entertaining players and spectators. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure were designed "to secure the 
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just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." 
U.R.Civ.P.l. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFFS CLAIM THAT THE SUMMONS WAS ISSUED 
IN THREE MONTHS IS WITHOUT MERIT. 
A. Plaintiff's claim that the Summons was given to Steven 
Jackson for purpose of service is frivolous. 
Prior to April 1, 1990, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 4(a) 
stated: "A summons shall be deemed to have issued when placed in 
the hands of a qualified person for the purpose of service." 
Assuming for a moment that Mr. Jackson was qualified, he 
certainly was not given the summons for the purpose of service. 
There is no dispute. Mr. Jackson was handed copies of the 
summons and complaint and told to hold off on service: 
Q (BY MS. PORTER) All right, I'd like to go through 
the chronology on these particular documents. And 
when I say these particular documents, I'm refer-
ring to the summons with complaints that you say 
that you received on October 19th, 1988, in the 
Muir case. 
A Okay. 
Q How did you receive those? 
A How? 
Q Uh-huh. 
A Mr. Schwartz gave them to me. 
Q Personally? 
A Yeah, he handed them to me. 
Q Were there any written notes or instructions with 
them? 
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A No. 
Q What did Mr. Schwartz tell you with respect to 
these summons with complaints? 
A I think he told me to hold off for a little bit. 
Q Did he give you any date or deadline as to when he 
wanted you to try to get them served? 
A No. 
Q What, then, did you do with these documents? 
A I just kept them there by my desk. 
Q Do you have a place that you keep things that 
aren't, or that don't require immediate attention? 
A Uh-huh. 
Q So you put them somewhere on your desk? 
A Yeah, I set them aside. 
Deposition of Steven F. Jackson, pp. 42-43. 
0 You mentioned that Mr. Schwartz told you to hold 
off for a while. 
A Yeah, that's all he told me. 
Q Was that the gist of the conversation, or was that 
exactly what he said? 
A That was what he told me. He handed it to me and 
said, "Hold off for a while." 
Q Had he done that before on occasion, attorneys had 
handed that to you and said, "Hold off for a 
while"? 
A He hadn't, but other attorneys have. 
Q Okay, what does that mean to you? Hold off until 
you get further word? 
A Yeah. 
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Q Okay. And do they sometimes come back and say, 
"Never mind, we've settled the case"? 
A That's happened before, yeah. 
Q Do they sometimes come back and say, "Never mind, 
I'll get somebody else to serve it"? 
A Yeah, and then they'll give it to, I guess a 
process server. Is that what they do full time? 
A constable, I guess you'd call them. 
Deposition of Steven F. Jackson, pp. 50-51. 
Jackson received no further instructions until July, 1989 
when he was contacted by Robert Copier. 
Q All right. And you don't recall any conversation 
with Mr. Schwartz about the summons and complaint 
after October of '88 until Mr. Copier called? 
A No. 
Q And tell me again when Mr. Copier called? 
Q I don't remember exactly when, but it was probably 
the first part of the month. 
Q July, 1989? 
A (No audible answer.) 
0 You have to answer audibly. 
A Yeah. 
Deposition of Steven F. Jackson, p. 51. 
In July 1989, Mr. Copier called Jackson and asked how much 
it would cost to have Jackson serve defendant Burt. The expense 
was too great and Mr. Copier chose not to have Jackson serve the 
summons and complaint. Instead, Mr. Copier sent Jackson cover 
letters and stamped envelopes addressed to the sheriff's offices 
in Hunterdon County, New Jersey and Grand County, Utah. 
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Jackson's only role in forwarding the summons and complaint for 
service was to drop them in the stamped and addressed envelopes 
that were provided by Copier, seal them and place them in the 
mail. Deposition of Steven F. Jackson, pp. 51-54. 
Had Schwartz intended Jackson to serve the summons and 
complaint on Apache in New Jersey, or Burt in Moab he would have 
made travel arrangements for Jackson, which he did not do: 
Q . . . Have you ever been handed a summons and 
complaint before, and then later discovered that 
it needed to be served out of state? 
A No. I usually look at them when I get them. 
Q If that had happened to you, what would your 
response be typically, if you can't get somebody 
served? 
A Say that again. 
Q In other words, if someone gave you a summons and 
complaint to serve out of state, what would you do 
with that, typically? Go back and ask the attor-
ney how you accomplish that? 
A
 Yeah, if they really wanted me to serve it. I 
guess I'd have to make arrangements to do it. 
Q Okay. You didn't do that with Mr. Schwartz in 
this case, did you? 
A What do you mean? 
Q You didn't go back and ask him how you were sup-
posed to serve Apache Powder in New Jersey, did 
you? 
A I don't recall that, no. 
Q Okay. Well, do you think you may have said that, 
and don't recall it? 
A No. 
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Q Or you1re pretty sure you didn't go ask him how to 
serve Apache in New Jersey? 
A Ifm pretty sure, I donft remember New Jersey. 
Deposition of Steven F. Jackson, pp. 57*59 (emphasis added). 
Rule 4(b) should be given a reasonable interpretation 
consistent with ordinary, common understanding of the terms used. 
The proces server must be given instructions to promptly serve 
the Summons and Complaint, and the instructions and information 
necessary to accomplish that goal. The rule is not satisfied 
when the summons and complaint are given to another for storage. 
The rule is not satisfied by some secret, subjective intent of 
counsel that someday, perhaps, the process server should take 
steps to perfect service. Nor is it satisfied by the attorney's 
subjective hope to comply with Rule 4. 
Any other interpretation would defeat the purposes of Rules 
4(a) and 4(b), which are: 
1. To assure that once an action is filed, the defendant 
receives reasonably prompt notice. The plaintiff is not the only 
party with an interest in the timely conclusion of litigation. 
While the complaint is on file, it is a matter of public record. 
As such it can impair the good name and credit of the defendant, 
particularly when it goes unanswered. 
2. To assure the intended operation of statutes of limi-
tations. This court has repeatedly held: 
[T]he policies behind statutes of limitations are "to 
promote justice by preventing surprises through the 
revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber 
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until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and 
witnesses have disappeared." 
Raithaus v. Saab-Scandia of America. Inc., 784 P.2d 1158, 1161 
(Utah 1989)(quoting Meyers v. McDonald. 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 
1981)(quoting Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express 
Agency, Inc.. 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944))). If, as plaintiff 
argues, a plaintiff could toll the statute of limitations by 
filing a complaint and doing nothing else, the salutary policies 
of the statutes of limitations would be defeated. It is not 
until the defendant has notice that he can gather evidence and 
interview witnesses. That is why courts have routinely held that 
the fundamental purpose of a statute of limitations is to insure 
timely notice to an adverse party so that he or she may assemble 
a defense while the facts are still fresh. E.Q., Elkins v. 
Derby. 12 Cal.3d 410, 115 Cal.Rptr. 641, 525 P.2d 81, 83 (Cal. 
1974) (en banc). 
3. To see that the plaintiff diligently proceeds with an 
action once it is filed. This is in keeping with the fundamental 
purposes of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as announced by 
Rule 1, the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every 
action. The idea of a just determination of disputes without 
rules which set an orderly procedure for notice and response, and 
which set at least some time limitations is absurd. A rule that 
dictates judgment against defendants who do not answer in a 
limited period of time is not harsh or unjust, to the contrary, 
it is a requirement of a system of orderly and efficient dispute 
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resolution. Similarly it Is not harsh or unfair to require 
plaintiff to proceed with some very minimum dispatch. The 
plaintiff chooses to be before the court. The plaintiff chooses 
to invoke the power of the state. The plaintiff chooses to 
consume the public's funds to resolve private disputes. The 
plaintiff chooses to hail defendants from hundreds, even 
thousands of miles into court. The plaintiff chooses to require 
defendants to incur great expense and suffer considerable incon-
venience/ without any prior review by anyone and without first 
having to present one shred of evidence. The plaintiff is given 
great power. It is not harsh or unjust to require that the 
plaintiff exercise that power with some minimal responsibility 
and proceed in a minimally timely fashion. 
B
* Mr. Jackson was not "Qualified" within the meaning 
of Rule 4. 
As of April 1, 1990, it is clear that an attorney of a party 
is not qualified to serve process. If an attorney cannot serve 
process, neither can the attorney's employee. 
Prior to April 1. 1990, Rule 4(d) defined those qualified to 
serve process as including persons "over the age of 21 years, and 
not a party to the action." In many portions of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, the term "party" is used to mean both the 
party and the attorney representing that party. For example, 
Rule 5 requires that copies of all documents filed with the court 
be served upon "each of the parties." It has always been the 
practice to serve only attorneys. Service upon the attorney is 
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service upon the party. Similarly, service fey t h e attorney is 
service by; the party. 
The due process clauses of the United States Constitution 
and the Utah Constitution require personal service before the 
court can exercise power over a defendant. Due process also 
requires some minimum assurance that personal service has In fact 
taken place. That appears to be the reason that a return of 
process is required to be sworn. This minimum assurance requires 
that the process server be objective, thus parties cannot serve 
process. 
When compared with parties, attorneys and their employees 
may have as much or more interest in service. As this case 
graphically illustrates, when an employee of a law firm is ques-
tioned about service, there may be tremendous pressure to testify 
in a manner to please the employer. Here, Mr. Jackson signed an 
affidavit that he was given the summons "for purpose of service." 
In reality, he was told not to serve the summons and complaint. 
The affidavit is false, plain and simple. 
This court should reject a very narrow, formalistic and lit-
eral interpretation of the former rule, or the present rule for 
that matter. The rules should be given an interpretation consis-
tent with its policies and purposes. The potential for gutter 
service and other abuses is simply too great under any other 
interpretation. Any other interpretation may be insufficient to 
meet due process requirements. 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE 
SAVINGS STATUTE DID NOT APPLY. 
The first words of the savings statute, Utah Code Ann. 
S 78-12-40, are: "If an action is commenced in due time." 
Commencement of an action within due time within the meaning of 
the statute is the first and foremost requirement for the appli-
cation of the statute, yet the statute does not define when an 
action is commenced within due time. The trial court correctly 
ruled that when the plaintiff files a complaint days before the 
statute runs, the action is commenced within due time within the 
meaning of the statute only if the plaintiff also follows up to 
see that issuance of the summons and service are performed on 
time as required by Rule 4. 
A. Plaintiff's interpretation of the savings statute 
is inconsistent with the background and history of 
Rules 3 and 4, 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure were modeled after, and 
are similar to, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Utah 
Supreme Court has long held that it is appropriate to look to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when interpreting the state 
rules of civil procedure. E.g., Wilson v. Lambert, 613 P.2d 765, 
767 n.2 (Utah 1980); Wineoar v. Slim Olsen, Inc., 122 Utah 487, 
252 P.2d 205, 207 (1953). The drafters of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure recognized there was an unanswered question as to 
whether the mere filing of the complaint with the clerk's office 
tolls a statute of limitation, or, whether any further step was 
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required, such as delivery of the summons and complaint for 
service, or service of the summons and complaint: 
When a federal or state statute of limitations is 
pleaded as a defense, a question may arise under this 
rule whether the mere filing of the complaint stops the 
running of the statute, or whether any further step is 
required, such as, service of the summons and complaint 
or their delivery to the marshal1 for service. The 
answer to this question may depend on whether it is 
competent for the Supreme Court, exercising the power 
to makes rules of procedure without affecting substan-
tive rights, to vary the operation of statutes of limi-
tations. The requirement of Rule 4(a) that the clerk 
shall forthwith issue the summons and deliver it to the 
marshall for service will reduce the chances of such a 
question arising. 
Notes of Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
S 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 3, p. 200 (West 1916). 
Whether the filing of the complaint or the issuance of 
the summons by the clerk or the actual service of the 
summons constitutes a "commencement" of the action, to 
stop the running of the Statute of Limitations, is a 
problem which presented itself to the Advisory 
Committee, but was unanswered. It would seem, however, 
that the filing of the complaint conditionally suspends 
the running of the Statute of Limitations, provided the 
summons is issued forthwith and served within a reason-
able time thereafter. 
Id. (quoting 8 Brooklyn L.Rev. 188). 
It is apparent from a comparison of the Federal and Utah 
rules that Utah Rules 3 and 4 were drafted to answer this very 
question. Utah Rule 3 requires that if an action is commenced by 
service, a copy must be filed within ten days or "the action thus 
commenced shall be deemed dismissed." The use of the terms 
"deemed dismissed" suggest that an action is commenced by service 
only conditionally, and only if the plaintiff follows up and 
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files the complaint with the clerk's office within ten days. 
Rule 4 also uses the terms "deemed dismissed.9* Again, the use of 
the terms "deemed dismissed** suggest that commencing an action by 
filing a complaint with the clerk's office tolls the statute of 
limitations only if the plaintiff follows up and issues and 
serves the complaint as required by Rule 4(a) and 4(b). 
B. Plaintiff's interpretation of the savings statute 
is inconsistent with the purposes of the statute 
of limitations and the saving statute, and also 
fundamental rules of statutory construction. 
Statutes must be interpreted in light of their purpose: 
[T]he fundamental consideration in interpreting stat-
utes is legislative intent; and that is determined in 
light of the purpose the statute was designed to 
achieve. 
Board of Educ. of Granite School Dist. v. Salt Lake County, 659 
P.2d 1030, 1033 (Utah 1983). Again, the purpose of statutes of 
limitations is to give defendants notice of claims against them 
before memories fade, evidence is lost and witnesses disappear. 
The savings statute and the statutes of limitations are part 
of the same title and chapter. They deal with the same subject 
matter. As such they are in pari materia. This court has long 
held that statutes In pari materia should be construed in harmony 
with each other. E.g., Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1318 
(Utah 1983). The savings statute compliments statutes of limita-
tions. When the purposes of the statute of limitations have been 
met, that is to say, when the defendant has received timely 
notice, then if the case is dismissed without prejudice, the 
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plaintiff should have additional time to bring the action again. 
The language in the savings statute "if any action is commenced 
within due time" should be interpreted as intended: "if the 
purpose and policy of the statute of limitations has been met." 
The savings statute applies only when the plaintiff has filed the 
complaint on time and in addition issued and served it on time. 
Any other interpretation of the savings statute would allow 
the savings statute to completely defeat the salutary policies 
behind the statutes of limitation. Here the plaintiff filed the 
complaint days before the statute ran and then waited more than 
ten months before making any effort to have the complaint served. 
Under the plaintiff's proposed interpretation of the savings 
statute, if it pleased the plaintiff she could have waited years 
more. When the court finally dismissed the complaint without 
prejudice, she could wait an additional year before filing a new 
complaint. She could wait three months more before issuing the 
summons and nine months more before service was perfected. She 
could stretch the statute of limitations several years. 
What if in the second action filed she again waited many 
months or years more than the three before issuing the complaint? 
The savings statute does not by its literal language distinguish 
between the first time an action is commenced and the second. 
Unless this court is willing to give the savings statute a 
reasonable interpretation consistent with the policy and purpose 
of the statute, the plaintiff could extent the statute of 
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limitations, never once giving notice to the defendants, for 
literally many, many years. During the delay memories will fade, 
evidence will be lost, witnesses will become unavailable. What a 
great tactical tool for a plaintiff who would like to wait to 
present his or her evidence until particular unfavorable evidence 
is no longer available. 
C Plaintiff's interpretation of the savings statute 
is inconsistent with the purposes of Rule 4 and 
renders these rules meaningless. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are just that—rules. 
They are not suggestions. They are not advisory. They are 
rules: 
Although the New Rules of Civil Procedure were 
intended to provide liberality in procedure, it is 
nevertheless expected that they will be followed, and 
unless reasons satisfactory to the court are advanced 
as the basis for relief from complying with them, 
parties will not be excused from so doing. 
C.M.C. Cassitv, Inc. v. Aird, 707 P.2d 1304, 1305 (Utah 1985). 
Under the plaintiffs interpretation of the savings statute, 
former Rules 4(a) and 4(b) become mere suggestions. So does the 
new Rule 4(b). These rules were intended to assure that the 
defendant receives reasonably prompt notice, that the purposes of 
the statute of limitations are met and assure that the action 
plaintiff chose to start is moved along with reasonable dispatch. 
In short, the rules, old and new, were intended to minimized 
delay. Under plaintiff's interpretation of the savings statute, 
delay would be enhanced, not minimized. 
-33-
D. Plaintiff's Interpretation of the savings statute 
creates a conflict between Rules 3 and 4 and the 
savings statute. 
When this court promulgated the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, it did not intend that there be any conflict with any 
statutes. Rule 1(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
These rules shall take effect on January 1, 1950; and 
thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be of 
no further force and effect. 
Nor did the legislature intend any conflict. The savings 
statute in question was part of the 1943 code. In 1951, that 
provision was repealed and re-enacted as part of House Bill No. 
31. 1951 Utah Laws, Ch. 58, S 104-12-40, p. 188. In re-enacting 
the statute, the legislature made it clear that the statute was 
being reenacted only so far as it was not inconsistent with the 
recently adopted rules of civil procedure: 
Section 1. Title 20 and Title 104, Utah Code Annotated 
1943, as amended, and Chapters 19, 33 and 34, Laws of 
Utah 1943; Chapters 3 and 10, Laws of Utah 1947; and 
Chapter 76, Laws of Utah 1949, insofar as the same have 
not been superseded by the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure as adopted by the Supreme Court of Utah, are 
hereby revised, codified and re-enacted into law as 
"The Judicial Code" under Title 104, as follows: 
1951 Utah Laws, Ch. 58, p. 150-51. 
The Utah Supreme Court has long held that courts must give 
interpretations to statutes which save them from potential con-
stitutional conflicts. E.g., Carlson v. Bos. 740 P.2d 1269, 1976 
(Utah 1987). 
The Utah Constitution is modeled after the United States 
Constitution. As such, it embodies principles of separation of 
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powers. The judicial branch has inherent power to promulgate 
rules which govern the conduct of its business. 
In 1985 the Utah State Constitution was amended to allow the 
legislature to enact statutes which interfere with the rules of 
civil procedure. Such statutes require a two-thirds majority 
vote. Utah Const., Art. VIII, S 4. Prior to this constitutional 
amendment/ the legislature had no power or prerogative to enact 
statutes which interfered with the rules of civil procedure. 
If the plaintiff is allowed to rely upon the savings 
statute, the savings statute renders Rules 4(a) and 4(b) meaning-
less and void. Similarly, plaintiff's interpretation of Rule 3 
would defeat the policies of the statute of limitations and the 
savings statute. 
Clearly the savings statute and the rules of civil procedure 
must be harmonized. 
E
- Plaintiff's interpretation of the savings statute 
and Rule 3 is inconsistent with the decisions of 
other courts that have interpreted similar rules. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 3 is modeled after Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 3. The federal rules says simply, ,f[a]n 
action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court." The 
Utah states that an action is commenced by either filing a com-
plaint or by service upon the defendant, followed in ten days by 
filing the complaint with the court. This court has repeatedly 
held that an inspection of the federal rules is helpful in 
interpreting the Utah Rules. E.g., Wilson v. Lambert, 613 P.2d 
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765, 767 n.2 (Utah 1980); Wlneoar v. Slim Olsen. Inc., 122 Utah 
487, 252 P.2d 205, 207 (1953). The brief of defendant Burt 
discusses many federal cases that have held that simply filing 
the complaint only commences the action conditionally. Those 
cases hold that if the plaintiff does not follow through and 
serve the complaint in 120 days under F.R.Civ.P. 4(j)# it is as 
if the case were never filed. This court should interpret the 
Utah Rules accordingly. 
There are also many state courts with rules similar to Utah 
Rule 3 that have held that merely filing the complaint only 
conditionally commences the action. 
Nevada Rule 3 states that an action is commenced by the fil-
ing of the complaint and the issuance of a summons. Nevada Rule 
4 requires that the summons be issued forthwith and delivered for 
service. The Nevada Supreme Court has interpreted these two 
rules as tolling the statute of limitations upon filing a com-
plaint only if the summons is immediately placed in the hands of 
the sheriff with the intention that it be served in due course. 
Deboer v. Fattor, 72 Nev. 316, 304 P.2d 958 (1956). 
In Washington filing a complaint only tentatively tolls the 
statute of limitations. The plaintiff must also obtain proper 
personal service within ninety days after filing the complaint. 
Patrick v. DeYounq, 45 Wash.App. 103, 724 P.2d 1064, 1066 
(Wash.App. 1986) . 
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In Arizona the statute is tolled by filing a complaint, only 
if, the plaintiff follows up and obtains good service within one 
year following the filing of the complaint. Peters v. M fc O 
Const,, Inc., 119 Ariz. 34, 579 P.2d 72 (Ariz. App. 1978). 
In Georgia, the statute of limitations is tolled by filing a 
complaint, only if, the plaintiff also perfects service within 
five days after filing the complaint. Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. 
Co. v. Citv of Claxton, 720 F.2d 1230 (11th Cir. 1983) (applying 
Georgia law). These are by no means the only courts which have 
interpreted similar rules in this manner. 
F. Plaintiff's interpretation of the rules and the 
savings statute is inconsistent with equal and 
evenhanded justice. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure were intended to promote 
the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action. 
U.R.Civ.P. l. "Justice" implies evenhandedness and equality. 
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure a defendant may be 
hailed into court from hundreds even thousands of miles away. In 
twenty days the defendant must hire counsel, investigate the 
claims raised in the complaint, determine the defenses which must 
be raised (some of which will be waived if not raised) and file 
an answer. If the defendant fails to do so, judgment may be 
taken for the full amount of the prayer. Of course Rule 6(b) and 
60(b) may give the defendant some relief upon proper showing. 
The justification for this is sound. The parties must be 
required to move matters along to completion. 
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The defendant, however, is not the only party with some 
responsibility to move the action along. It would be incredible 
and unjust, to say the least, if the plaintiff were not also 
required to move matters along to completion. The plaintiff had 
two years to file a complaint. She had three months more just to 
give the summons and complaint to a process server and give that 
process server instructions to get it served. She had nine 
months more than that to see that service was perfected. She 
also had the possibility of relief under Rules 6(b) and 60(b) 
upon the proper showing. 
Under plaintiff's interpretation, the plaintiff was not 
required to move the case along by some minimum effort. To the 
contrary, the plaintiff argues she should be given more oppor-
tunity for delay. Such a result would not even approach 
evenhandedness. 
POINT V 
PLAINTIFF NEVER ASKED FOR A HEARING AT THE 
TRIAL COURT OR RAISED THE ISSUE OF CONSTI-
TUTIONALITY OF THE COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF 
THE SAVINGS STATUTE. THESE ISSUES WERE NOT 
PRESERVED. 
Claims of error may not be raised the first time on appeal. 
The trial court must be given an opportunity to address and 
correct claims of error, or they are waived. E.g., Busch Corp. 
v. State Fame Fire & Cas. Co.. 743 P.2d 1217, 1219 (Utah 1987). 
Plaintiff appears to argue that the trial court erred by 
failing to hold an evidentiary hearing ,for some other hearing" to 
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determine whether summons had issued on time. The plaintiff 
simply never asked for such a hearing and cannot now complain. 
Under Rule 4-501(3) of the Utah Code of Judicial Adminis-
tration, district courts decide motions without hearing "unless 
ordered by the court, or requested by the parties as provided in 
paragraph (3)(b; or (4)" of that rule. Rule 4-501(3)(b) allows 
parties to file a written request for a ruling if the motion 
would dismiss claims with prejudice. Rule 4-501(3)(f) states 
that if such a written request for hearing is not filed with the 
parties* principal memoranda, "a hearing on the motion shall be 
deemed waived." 
Plaintiff did not request such a hearing. To the contrary, 
the plaintiff filed a written Request for Ruling in civil number 
5719, asking that the motions to dismiss be decided pursuant to 
Rule 4-501(3), i.e., without hearing. (Rl. 83). Plaintiff did 
the same in civil number 5873. (R2. 145). 
Plaintiff also appears to argue that the trial court's 
interpretation of the savings statute violates equal protection 
and the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution. The 
plaintiff never raised these issues at the trial level, and even 
now does not seriously argue the point. 
It is axiomatic that statutes are presumed to be con-
stitutional and that the party challenging a statute's 
constitutionality bears the burden of proving that it 
is invalid. 
State v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1990). 
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It is difficult at best to guess exactly why plaintiff 
believes the court1s interpretation of the savings statute denies 
her access to the courts. Apache can only conjecture as to why 
the argument is not articulated. Perhaps the plaintiff is not 
serious about the argument. Perhaps the plaintiff hopes to arti-
culate it for the first time in a reply brief, thus preventing 
the defendants from effectively addressing it. In any event the 
defendants are at a disadvantage. It may be sufficient to point 
what this court has said about the open courts provision, Utah 
Const. Art. I § 11: 
Necessarily, the Legislature has great latitude in 
defining, changing, and modernizing the law, and in 
doing so may create new rules of law and abrogate old 
ones. 
Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 676 (Utah 1985). 
Obviously, section 11 rights also are subject to 
reasonable rules of procedure for the adjudication of 
these and all other right. 
Id., at 677, n.5. 
The Legislature clearly has a valid interest in 
limiting the time within which a legal action may be 
commenced once it arises. 
Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087, 1091 (Utah 1989). 
[SJection 11 rights are not always paramount, 
either. They do not sweep all other constitutional 
rights and prerogatives before them. They, too, like 
many constitutional rights, must be weighed against and 
harmonized with other constitutional provisions. The 
accommodation of competing, and sometimes clashing, 
constitutional rights and prerogatives is a task of the 
greatest delicacy, although a common and necessary one 
in constitutional adjudication. 
Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 677 (Utah 1985). 
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Among these competing rights is the defendants1 right to 
notice within a reasonable period of time so they can preserve 
evidence and effectively prepare a defense to claims leveled 
against them. 
Plaintiff's equal protection claims are even more difficult 
to guess at. If a defendant delays the case by failing to file 
an answer or motion to dismiss in 20 days, the court may enter 
default. It is difficult at best to understand plaintiff's claim 
that failure to give her unlimited opportunity for delay discrim-
inates against her. If anything, plaintiff's proposed interpre-
tation of the Rules and savings statute would discriminate 
against the defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff's appeal should be dismissed for lack of juris-
diction. In the alternative, the orders of the district court 
should be affirmed. 
DATED this 10th day of December, 1990. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSfitf & MARTLWEAt 
m E. Draney 
Attorneys for Apache/tfi^ trogen 
Products 
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ItOBERT H. COPZEX - #737 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
243 Bast 400 South, Suits 200 
fait Lake City, Utah §4111 
Telephone: (iOl) 531-0099 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
•ALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
DOUGLAS BAILEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
APACHE POWDER COMPANY, 
a Hew Jersey corporation, 
tf.H. BUKT EXPLOSIVES, INC., 
a New Kexico corporation, and 
DOES I-X, 
Defendant^ 
1 COXPLAXMT AND JURY DEMAND 
1 Civil No. 900903526P1 
1 Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
Plaintiff alleges: 
1. Plaintiff Douglas Bailey (Bailey) is a cititen of the 
State of Utah residing in Salt Lake County/ 
2. Defendant W. H. Burt Explosives, Inc., (Burt) is a 
New Kexico Corporation engaged in the business of selling materials 
used in blasting operations, including safety fuses. At all tines 
relevant hereto, Burt did business in the State of Utah. 
3. Defendant Apache Powder Company (Apache) is a New 
Jersey Corporation engaged in the, business of manufacturing snd 
selling materials used in blasting operations, including safety 
fuses. At all times relevant hereto, Apache did business in the 
State of Utah. 
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ADDENDUM A 
4. Does I - X are presently unknown manufacturers, 
sellers, and/or distributors of safety fuses that were ultimately 
sold to Bailey and were utilised in connection with the explosion 
complained of herein. 
5. This court possesses jurisdiction over the parties 
and subject matter of this action pursuant to B.C.A. 178-3-4. 
6. None of the named Defendants resides in this state 
and Plaintiff has properly designated venue in this county pursuant 
to U.C.A. 178-13-7. 
FACTS 
7. On or about August 26, 1986, Bailey purchased from 
Burt various materials for use iri a blasting and mining operation 
located on property owned by Wallace A. Muir and his family in 
Duchesne County, Utah (Kuir Mine). 
8. Among the materials purchased by Bailey from Burt was 
white wax safety fuse to be used for ignition of blasting caps, 
dynamite, and ammonium nitrate fuel oil (AKFO). 
9. The white wax safety fuse purchased by Bailey from 
Burt was, on information and belief, manufactured in whole or in 
part by Apache and/or Does I - X, and sold by Apache and/or Does 
I - X to Burt. 
10. At the time of Bailey*s purchase, no warnings of any 
kind were given to Bailey by Burt, Apache, or Does I - X concerning 
characteristics of the safety fuse which could cause a premature 
explosion when used in conjunction with blasting caps, dynamite, 
and AKFO. 
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11. Subsequent to Balley*e purchase of the safety fuse 
from Burt, the fuse vas need in bleating operetlons at the Nuir 
Nine by bailey and others. On information and belief, fturt knew 
at the time it aold the fuae to Bailey that the fuse vaa to be used 
for aaid purpose at the Muir Mine. 
12. On or about September ft. It16, Bailey out several 
segments of safety fuse of equal length from the fuse purchased 
fro* Burt. In cutting the safety fuae into segments, Bailey 
utilised e aeasuring stick that was approxiaately five feet three 
inches (5*3") in length. Bach segment of safety fuse cut by Burt 
vas equal in length to the length of the stick. Bailey then 
carefully attached several such segments to blasting caps and 
dynamite. Bailey and Wallace A. Muir then caused the dynamite 
charges prepared by Bailey to be placed inside the Nuir Mine into 
four foot (4') deep holes, which were then filled with ANFO. 
13. Bailey prepared a timer fuse by taking one of the 
segments of epproximatly five feet three inches (5'3") in length 
that had not been attached to any blasting cap and shortening that 
segment for safety purposes by approximately one foot (1')* Bailey 
then lit this shortened safety segment and proceeded to light the 
longer segments that had been attached to blasting caps and 
dynamite and placed in the four foot (4') holes. While he lit the 
longer segments, Bailey used the shortened safety segment es a 
timer fuse by regularly observing it to insure that there was time 
left to safely exit the aine. 
14. After lighting all but the last charge, Bailey's 
timer fuse was atill one to two feet long, leaving hla ample time 
to light the last charge and to axit aafely with Wallace A. Muir 
from the sine. Suddenly, a violent axplosion caused the death of 
Wallace A. Muir and serious injury to Bailey. Mario Jenkins, who 
vas outside the aine at the time of the blast that killed Wallace 
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A. Muir and seriously injured Bailey, rushed Bailey to the Duchesne 
County Hospital. Bailey vas transferred by ambulance to St. Mark's 
Hospital in Bait Lake County where be vas hospital 1 ted for 
approximately tvo (2) veeks for burns and wounds from the 
explosion. 
FIRST CLAIM fPR REMIT 
(Products Liability) 
15. Plaintiff repeats and incorporates by this reference 
the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 - 1 4 herein. 
16. Burt, Apache, and Does Z - X, at all times relevant 
hereto, were engaged in the business of selling materials utilised 
in blasting, including the safety fuse ultimately purchased by 
Bailey from Burt. 
17. Burt, Apache, and Does I - X, expected that the 
safety fuse sold by then, vhich vas ultimately purchased by Bailey 
from Burt, would reach the user or consumer of the safety fuse 
without substantial change in the condition in which it was sold 
by Burt, Apache, and Does I - X. 
18. The safety fuse sold by Burt, Apache, end Does X * 
X, which was ultimately purchased by Bailey from Burt, reached the 
user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in 
which it was sold by Burt, Apache, and Does I - X. 
19. At the time Burt, Apache, and Does I • X, mold the 
safety fuse which was ultimately purchased by Bailey from Burt, it 
vas in a defective condition end unreasonably dangerous to the user 
or consumer of the safety fuse, in that the burning rate of the 
fuse varied substantially at different sections of the fuse and no 
warning was supplied vith the fuse concerning the potential or 
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actual vide diacrapaney in burning rataa of tha fuaa. 
20. Tha dafaetlva and unreasonably dangaroua aafaty fuaa 
•old by Burt, Apache, and Doas I - X, proximately eauaad tha 
explosion which Injured Bailey end killed Wallace A. Mulr. 
21. Plaintiff Bailey la entitled to recover from 
Dafandante ell damages suatalned by hie ea e result of tha 
explosion, Including but not Halted to, his past, praaant end 
future medical expenses, lost earning*, hie past, preeent, end 
future physical pain end suffering end mental enguish, his past, 
praaant, end future eaotional diatraaa over tha death of Wallace 
A. Muir, his paat, present, end future loss of enjoyment of life, 
and damages for physical disfigurement end dieability, In en amount 
presently not ascertained but which will be proved et trial, 
together with prejudgment interest, costs, end attorney's fees, to 
the fullest extent allowed by lew. 
SECOND CLAIM TOR RELIEF 
(Breach of Implied Warranty) 
22. Plaintiff repeats end Incorporates by this reference 
the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 - 2 1 herein. 
23. Burt, Apache, end Does I - X impliedly warranted that 
the safety fuse sold by them, end which was ultimately purchaaed 
by Bailey from Burt, would be merchantable end fit for the purpoaas 
for which it was intended. 
24. It waa reasonably foreseeable to Burt, Apache, end 
Does I - X, that the eafety fuaa sold by them would be ueed, among 
other things, to ignite blasting caps, dynamite, end ANPO. 
Further, such e uee for sefety fuse waa one of the purposes for 
which eafety fuaa waa end ie Intended. 
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25. Burt, Apache, and Does Z - X breeched their implied 
varranties that the safety fuse sold by then and purchased by 
bailey from burt vas merchantable and tit for the purposes for 
which it vas intended by vailing safety fuse that burned at vidaly 
varying rates and vas therefore unfit for the ignition of blasting 
caps, dynamite, and AXPO. 
26. The breeches of implied warranty by burt, Apache, and 
Does X - X, proximately resulted in the explosion vhich injured 
bailey and killed Wallace A. Muir. 
27. Plaintiff Baii«y i% entitled to recover from 
Defendants all damages sustained by him as a result of the 
explosion, including but not limited to, his past, present, and 
future medical expenaes, lost earnings, his past, present, and 
future physical pain and suffering and mental anguish, hla past, 
present, and future emotional distress over the death of Wallace 
A. Muir, his past, present, and future loss of enjoyment of life, 
and damages for physical disfigurement and disability, in an amount 
presently not ascertained but vhich vill be proved at trial, 
together with prejudgment interest, costs, and attorney's fees, to 
the fullest extent allowed by law. 
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Negligence) 
26. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by this reference 
the allegations set forth at Paragrapha 1 - 2 7 herein. 
29. As manufacturers and/or sellers of material utilised 
in blasting operations, including safety fuse, Burt, Apache, and 
Does I - X, owed a duty to the public generally, and to Bailey 
specifically, to take reasonable care in the manufacturing, 
diatribution, and sale of said materials. Among other things, 
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Burt, Apache, and Doaa X » X, evad Bailay tha duty to provide 
sufficient inatructiona and/or warning* concaming tha use of tha 
aafaty fuaa in blaating operations, particularly regarding tha 
unpredictable and varying Burning rata of tha aafaty fuaa. 
Additionally, Apache and/or Doaa X - X, aa tha manufacture™ of tha 
safety fuaa, oved Bailay tha duty to take reasonable precautions 
and care in tha manufacturing process to insure that tha aafaty 
fuaes burned at a constant and safe rate before selling it to 
diatributora, wholesalers, or retail outlata. 
30. Burt, Apache, and Doaa X - X braached their duties 
oved to Bailey, by, among other things, negligently failing to 
provide sufficient instructions and/or warnings concerning the uaa 
of the aafaty fuse in blesting operations involving blaating eapa, 
dynamite, and ANFO. Additionally, Apache and/or Does X - X 
breached their duties owed to Bailey by negligently failing to 
Insure that the safety fuae burned at a constant rate before 
selling it to distributors, wholesalers, or retail outlets. 
31. On information and belief, the rate of burn of the 
safety fuse sold by Burt to Bailey and manufactured and distributed 
by Apache end Does X - X changes with tine. Defendants owed a duty 
of care to the public in general and to Bailey in particular to 
control the inventory of white wax aafaty fuae and manage the ahelf 
ILife from the time of original manufacture to the time of aale to 
the ultimate consumer or user. Defendants breached this duty of 
care. Defendants negligently feiled to adequately inquire of and 
adequately inform Bailey of the uaes and propensities of the aafaty 
fuse that is the subject of this action. 
32. The negligence of Burt, Apache, and Does X • X, 
proximately resulted in the oxplosion that injured Bailay and 
l:llled Wallace A. Muir. 
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93. Plaintiff bailey la entitled to recover from 
Defendants all damages sustained by his as a result of the 
explosion, including but not limited to, his past, praaant and 
future medical expenses, lost aamings, his past, praaant, and 
future physical pain and suffering and mantel anguish, bis past, 
praaant, and future emotional distress ever the death of Wallace 
A. Huir, bla past, praaant, and future loss of enjoyment of Ufa, 
and damages for physical disfigurement and disability, in an amount 
presently not ascertained but which vill be proved at trial, 
together with prejudgment interest, costs, and attorney's fees, to 
the fullest extent allowed by lav. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief as follows: 
1. For judgment against the Defendants for all damages 
sustained by Bailey as a result of the explosion, Including but not 
limited to his past, present, and future medical axpenses, lest 
earnings, his past, present, and future physical pain and suffering 
and mental anguish, his past, present, and future emotional 
distress over the death of Wallace A. Muir, his past, present, and 
future loss of enjoyment of life, and damages for physical 
disfigurement and disability, in an amount presently not 
ascertained but which vill be proved at trial. 
2. For interest, costs, and attorney'a fees, to the 
fullest extent allowed by lav, together with such other and further 
relief as the Court deems just or equitable in the premiaes. 
DATED this '"^ day of Spxv+rymtiT) 
AttSrneyTor PiaintifrX 
Plaintiff desands trial by jury. 
DATED this Sf~ day of Juna, lt»0. 
Plaintiff's Address: 
55 6th Avenue 
Midvale, Utah S4047 
dougapac.com 
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H. JAMES CLEGG [A0681] 
SHAWN E. DRANEY [A4026] 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN fc MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Apache Powder Company 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DOUGLAS BAILEY, 
Plaintiff, ORDER TRANSFERRING VBNUE TO THE 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
vs. 
APACHE POWDER COMPANY, a New 
Jersey corporation; W. H. BURT Civil No. 900903526PI 
EXPLOSIVES, INC., a New Mexico 
corporation, and DOES I-X, Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
Defendants. 
This matter came before the court on the defendants' motions 
for change of venue. The court having reviewed the memoranda of 
counsel and good cause appearing therefore, this court entered a 
minute entry dated October 2, 1990. Pursuant to this court's* 
minute entry dated October 2, 1990, and for the reasons stated 
therein, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. venue in this matter is hereby transferred to the seventh 
Judicial District court for Grand County, state of Utah. As soon 
as the plaintiff pays the appropriate transfer and filing fees, the 
clerk shall transfer all of the pleadings and other papers filed 
in this matter to that court. 
ADDENDUM B 
2. Within ten (10) days fron the date of this order, 
plaintiff shall submit the appropriate transfer and filing fees to 
the appropriate elerX(s). If plaintiff fails to do so, the case 
will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, as required by Utah 
Code Ann. S 78-13-11 (1953). 
DATBD this / -~~ day Of fl^ftrJb&r 1990. 
BY THE/COURT: 
H. JAKES CLE6G [A0681] 
SHAWN E. DRANTY [A4026] 
SHOW, CKRISTENSEN & XARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Apache Powder Company 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DOUGLAS BAILEY, 
STIPULATION REGARDING 
Plaintiff, DISCOVERY 
vs. 
APACHE POWDER COMPANY, a New 
Jersey corporation? W. H. BURT Civil No. 900903526PI 
EXPLOSIVES, INC., a New Mexico 
corporation, and DOES I-X, Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
Defendants. 
Douglas Bailey, Evelyn Muir, Apache Powder Company and W. 
H. Burt Explosives, Inc., by and through their attorneys, enter 
into this stipulation regarding discovery, as follows: 
1. Douglas Bailey and Evelyn Muir were plaintiffs in 
two lawsuits against Apache Powder Company and W. H. Burt 
Explosives, Inc., filed in the Seventh District Court, Civil 
Number 5719 and Civil Number 5873. These cases have been 
dismissed. Evelyn Muir's claims are now the subject of 
ADDENDUM C 
Utah supreme court Consolidated Case No. 90100. Douglas Bailey's 
claims are now the subject of Third District Court Case No. 
900903526PI. 
2. This stipulation is aade for the purpose of promoting 
judicial economy; reducing expense, burden, and delay for all 
parties; increasing witness convenience; and serving justice. 
3. The undersigned counsel for plaintiffs represents Bvelyn 
Muir in Utah supreme Court Consolidated Case No. 90100 and 
represents Douglas Bailey in Third District Court Case No. 
900903526PI. The undersigned counsel for defendants represent 
their respective clients in both cases. 
4. The parties are concerned that discovery conducted in 
Civil Number 900903526PI not be repeated in the event the 
dismissed claims described above are remanded for trial. The 
parties stipulate and agree that if such a remand occurs, the 
discovery in civil Number 90090352BPI can be used the same as if 
that discovery were conducted in Civil Numbers 5719 and 5873. 
Similarly, any discovery conducted in civil numbers 5719 and 5873-
can be used the same as if that discovery were conducted In Civil 
Number 900903526PI. The cases shall be considered consolidated 
for purposes of discovery. 
5. Nothing herein or done pursuant hereto shall constitute 
a general appearance by any party In any proceeding or a waiver 
of any objection to venue or jurisdiction by any party in any 
proceeding. 
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6. Zf any change or changes of venue art granttd la any 
proceeding described above, or if any consolidation or 
consolidations of easts described above are Bade or any 
renumbering of the cases occurs, the terms hereof shall be of 
full force and effect after such change or changes of venue are 
granted or such consolidation or consolidations of eases are Bade 
or such renumbering occurs. Nothing herein shall be construed as 
a consent to or a waiver of any objection to any change of venue 
or consolidation of cases in any proceeding between any of the 
parties to this stipulation. 
DATED this jT day of 
E. Draney 
Attorneys for Defend* 
Apache Powder Compj 
DATED this O day of fT^f* 7
 1990. 
Copier 
Plaintiff 
DATED this day of , 1990. 
CXRISTBNSEN, JENSEN * POWELL 
By 
Karra J. Porter 
Attorneys for Defendant 
w. H. Burt Explosives, Inc. 
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PROOF OF SERVICE 
This will certify that I caused 
four (4) copies of this Brief of Appellee Apache Nitrogen 
Products, Appeal No, 900100 to be mailed, first-class, postage 
prepaid, to each of the following on the 10th day of December, 
1990: 
Robert H. Copier, Esq. 
243 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
and Cross-Appellee 
Karra J, Porter, Esq, 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
175 So. West Temple, #510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Appellee and Cross-Ap 
W. H. Burt Explosives, Inc. 
DATED this 10th day of December 
ShawrrT:. Draney 
Attorney for Appellee Crfcss-
Appellant Apache pjltrocefi Products 
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